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The climate for enlarge-
ment has become less
favourable in the last
decade, triggering a new
strategy for enlargement
based on stricter condition-
ality and on the capacity of
the Union to integrate new
members.
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By Sonia Piedrafita Sonia Piedrafita Sonia Piedrafita Sonia Piedrafita Sonia Piedrafita*1
The Lisbon Treaty was negotiated against the background of a new strategy on enlargement
based on consolidation of existing commitments, better communication to citizens, stricter
conditionality and the consideration of the EU’s capacity to integrate new members. It has
introduced some changes to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which specifies the
basic procedures for accession of new members. These relate to the promotion of the EU values,
better information to both the national and the European parliaments and the explicit reference
to conditions for entry laid down by the European Council. This contribution, on the one hand,
reviews this new strategy on enlargement. On the other, it examines to which extent the new
treaty provisions reflect the less favourable climate and whether they may represent any major
change in practice.
capacity”. It will then examine whether the new provisions
introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon reflect this less favourable
climate for enlargement and to which extent they are going
to make a difference to common practice so far.
From absorption capacity to integration capacity From absorption capacity to integration capacity From absorption capacity to integration capacity From absorption capacity to integration capacity From absorption capacity to integration capacity
The climate for enlargement has become less favourable in
the last decade, triggering a new strategy for enlargement
based on stricter conditionality and on the capacity of the
Union to integrate new members without hindering its
goals and policies. Traditional concerns about the impact
of new members on the
functioning of the Commun-
ity institutions and policies
turned into the notion of
“absorption capacity” on the
occasion of last enlarge-
ment, and “integration
capacity” more recently.
Even though it was not
until June 1993 that the
Copenhagen European
Council first formally stated
that “the Union’s capacity to
absorb new members, while
maintaining the momentum
of European Integration”
was an important consider-
ation to take into account
when considering a mem-
bership application, these
were already concerns in previous rounds of enlargement.
One fear about the accession of Denmark, Ireland and the
United Kingdom was that it could affect the capacity of the
Enlargement of the EU has figured prominently in recent
public debates over the future of Europe. It was regarded
as an important factor behind the negative result in the
referendums on the Constitutional Treaty in France and the
Netherlands, even though the reasons given by citizens for
a negative vote were usually related to economic
considerations, the lack of information or the threat to the
national government.2 Indeed, support for enlargement
has been decreasing in the recent years in many old
Member States,3 and only 29% of their citizens think that
enlargement has a positive impact on the EU.4
At the EU level, decision-makers seem to prefer a pause
in order to digest completely
the last accessions and
consolidate existing commit-
ments. Caution about further
enlargements is also fed by
uncertainty about how en-
largement is going to affect
the future of the EU in terms
of the manageability of its
decision-making process,
deeper integration or a single
voice in the world. Inevitably,
enlargement-related issues
have been present in both
the European Convention’s
debates and the intergovern-
mental negotiations leading
to the Treaty of Lisbon.
This contribution will first
review the policy background
against which the recent Treaty reform has taken place,
focusing on the new strategy on enlargement, and on the
evolution from “absorption capacity” to “integrationwww.eipa.eu
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The accommodation or
“absorption” of the new
members may be regarded
as a successful but still
ongoing process, with
neither they nor the Union
having fully finalised the
necessary adjustments.
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Community to work efficiently and further complicate
progress in Community policies (Deighton and Milward
1999). And when the Community was still digesting with
some difficulties the absorption of these new members, the
application of Greece again prompted voices of alarm
about both the institutional capacity of the EC to work with
more members and the consequences for the integration
process (Verney 2007). The subsequent applications by
Portugal and Spain further increased these concerns
(Tsoukalis 1981).
The first response to the membership applications from
the EFTA countries (Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden),
and to increasing pressure
from the Central and Eastern
European Countries (CEECs)
for a clear “European pers-
pective”, was the Commis-
sion’s report “Europe and
the challenge of enlarge-
ment”, submitted to the
Lisbon European Council in
June 1992. The report
outlined the challenges that
the accession of the EFTA
countries, and to a still
greater extent the accession
of the CEECs, could pose for
the effectiveness of the
Community, its institutions,
and the development of the
common policies (EC 1992).
Indeed, one of the main reasons for excluding from the
Association Agreements with the CEECs a “membership
clause”, such as had been included in similar agreements
with Greece and Turkey in the past, had been the risk that
their accession could pose for the “deepening” process
taking place in 1991, when the terms of political and
economic union were agreed.
The capacity to absorb new members was traditionally
assessed through the Commission’s opinions on the
applications for membership, examining on the one hand
the candidates’ ability to assume the obligations of
membership including their acceptance of EU policies and,
on the other, the impact of accession on the Union, in areas
such as the functioning of the rotating Council Presidency,
estimates of net financial transfers based on existing common
policies, or the addition of official EU languages. Given the
special difficulties and challenges involved in the eastern
enlargement, the possible consequences were the subject
of a special Commission Communication in 1997: “Agenda
2000: For a stronger and wider Union”. In this case, the
Commission not only delivered an opinion on the candidates’
applications but also examined the likely impact of the
enlargement more generally, proposing EU budgetary and
policy reforms (EC 1997). In the same vein, in parallel to the
Regular Report on Turkey and its recommendation to open
negotiations in October 2004, the Commission also
presented a detailed Impact Study on “Issues raised by
Turkey’s possible membership in the European Union”.5
A thorough preparation process by both the EU and the
CEECs has helped ensure – so far – a smooth functioning
of the EU institutions and a similar delivery of results after
enlargement (Best et al 2008). However, the accession of
ten new Member States in May 2004 and Bulgaria and
Romania in January 2007 has also posed important
challenges for the manageability of the decision-making
process, especially in view of the increased size and
heterogeneity and the specific features of the newcomers.
The accommodation or “absorption” of the new members
may be regarded as a successful but still ongoing process,
with neither they nor the Union having fully finalised the
necessary adjustments. On the one hand, the EU institutional
and treaty reform process has not been completed yet, and
pressure for further change may still emerge in the future
as the result of enlargement and other factors. On the
other, the new Member States are still in the process of
developing efficient mechanisms to participate in and
influence EU decision-
making, improve their ad-
ministrative capacity to
implement the acquis and
EU policies, and prepare
their economies for full
membership of the Economic
and Monetary Union and
the challenges of the Lisbon
strategy.
The need to allocate time
and resources to the goal of
completing the process
successfully, the increasing
pressure for accession from
candidate and potential
candidate countries, the
treaty-reform fatigue result-
ing from two decades of
intense widening and deepening, and the blame laid on
enlargement for the failure of the ratification of the European
Constitution, all triggered the development of a new strategy
by the European Commission in 2005. “Consolidation,
Conditionality, Communication: The strategy of the
enlargement policy” was based on three lines of action:
consolidation of existing commitments, better communi-
cation to citizens in order to improve the legitimacy of the
process, and application of fair and rigorous conditionality
to the candidate countries so that they are ready to fulfil
their obligations as members and implement Community
policies (EC 2005). The Commission stressed that future
enlargement should depend on the candidate’s
performance in meeting the standards in order to ensure
the smooth absorption of the new members, and should
also guarantee the capacity of the Union to act and decide
according to a fair balance within its institutions.
Rigorous and fair conditionality implies first that the
“Union has ‘to demand fulfilment of the accession criteria
and duly reward countries that make progress” and,
second, that “accession negotiations at any stage in the
accession process may be suspended if these criteria are
not met.” Whereas the fulfilment of the enlargement criteria
implied a single judgement as to whether an applicant met
the minimal requirements for membership, the principle of
conditionality involves continuous scrutiny by the EU of all
spheres of the legal, political and economic reforms in the
candidate countries (Kochenov 2005). Conditionality gives
the Union guarantees that obligations are assumed by the
applicants, and allows differentiation between complying
and non-complying candidates. Conditionality indeed
became a new principle of enlargement throughout the
accession process of the CEECs. Membership was
conditioned first to fulfilment of the Copenhagen criteria.EIPASCOPE 2008/1
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The Luxembourg European Council of December 1997
agreed that, even though negotiations could be opened
with those candidates that satisfied the political criteria,
conclusion of the negotiations would be conditional on
their fulfilment of the economic criteria and satisfactory
adoption of the acquis. The Accession Partnerships went a
step further and conditioned the reception of accession aid
to the fulfilment of the criteria.
This new strategy was followed by discussions in the
Council on whether to include the EU’s capacity to integrate
new members as a new criterion when considering an
application, with the June 2006 European Council
requesting the Commission to present a special report in
this regard.6 In its report, the Commission stated that the
EU’s “integration capacity” (rather than “absorption
capacity”) depended on the development of the EU’s
policies and institutions, as well as on the transformation of
applicants into well-prepared Member States (EC 2006).
The capacity of would-be members to accede to the Union
should be “rigorously assessed by the Commission on the
basis of strict conditionality”. “Integration capacity” also
means assessing “whether the EU can take in new members
at a given moment or in a given period, without jeopardizing
the political and policy objectives established by the Treaties.”
In order to maintain the momentum of European integration
“as it enlarges the Union needs to ensure that its institutions
continue to act effectively, that its policies meet their goals,
and that its budget is commensurate with its objectives and
with its financial resources.” The EU’s integration capacity
will be reviewed at all key stages of the accession process.
In its opinions on applications for membership and in the
course of accession negotiations, the Commission will
provide impact assessments of accession on key policy
areas.
In November 2006 the European Parliament adopted a
Report drafted by Alexander Stubb on the institutional
aspects of the Union’s capacity to integrate new members.
This acknowledged the EU’s “difficulties to honour its
commitments towards South-East European countries”,
and called for a series of institutional changes to improve
the EU’s “integration capacity”. These changes included
adoption of a new system of qualified-majority voting in the
Council; a clear definition of the EU’s values, objectives and
competences; more transparency in Council’s operations
or increased powers of scrutiny for national parliaments,
most of them already envisaged on the Constitutional
Treaty. The Parliament welcomed the abandonment of the
term “absorption capacity” since the “EU does not in any
way absorb its members”, but stressed that “integration
capacity” should not be “a new criterion applicable to the
candidate countries” and that responsibility for improving
“integration capacity” lay within the Union itself.7 Although
the December 2006 European Council did not include
“integration capacity” as an additional criterion for the
candidate countries, it did agree on a “renewed consensus
on enlargement” based on the new enlargement strategy
(consolidation, conditionality and communication) and the
EU’s capacity to integrate new members as proposed by the
Commission.
Implications of the new Treaty Implications of the new Treaty Implications of the new Treaty Implications of the new Treaty Implications of the new Treaty
Against the background of this new strategy and increasing
concerns about future accessions, the current treaty reform
has introduced some changes regarding enlargement.
This section will examine to which extent the new provisions
are reflecting the less favourable climate on the issue and
what changes they might involve in practice.
The European Council in June 2007, in its Draft Mandate
for the 2007 Intergovernmental Conference, tried to
combine the consensus reached during the deliberations
before signature of the Constitutional Treaty (which was
more positive with regard to enlargement) with this new,
less favourable climate. The resulting changes to Article 49
of the Treaty on European Union, which specifies the basic
procedures for accession of new members, include the
promotion of EU values as a condition to apply and the
notification of the new applications to both the national and
the European parliaments, as envisaged in the Constitutional
Treaty. The Draft Mandate added the consideration of the
conditions of eligibility decided by the European Council to
the list, and dropped the article stating the open nature of
the EU in the Constitutional Treaty.
The text as modified by the Treaty of Lisbon thus reads
as follows:
Any European State which respects the values referred
to in Article 2 and is committed to promoting them may
apply to become a member of the Union. The European
Parliament and national Parliaments shall be notified of
this application. The applicant State shall address its
application to the Council, which shall act unanimously
after consulting the Commission and after receiving the
consent of the European Parliament, which shall act by
a majority of its component members. The conditions of
eligibility agreed upon by the European Council shall be
taken into account.
The respect and promotion of EU values The respect and promotion of EU values The respect and promotion of EU values The respect and promotion of EU values The respect and promotion of EU values
Before 1999, the only requirement for a state to apply for
membership was to be European. The term “European”
was considered to be a non-fixed, ever-changing concept
that combined geographical, historical and cultural elements
that constituted the “European identity” (EC 1992:11).
After the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, an
applicant country also had to respect the principles of
freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.8 The Amsterdam
Treaty also introduced a procedure to allow the provisional
suspension of certain membership rights in case of the
breach of these principles by a Member State, which was
further reinforced by the Treaty of Nice. Since then, the role
of these principles as guidelines for EU decision-making
has increased across many policy areas.
The European Convention added human dignity and
equality to the list, dropping the fundamental freedoms,
and stated that “these values are common to the Member
States in a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity
and non-discrimination.” The 2003 IGC added that in this
society “the principle of equality between women and men
prevail” and emphasised “the rights of the persons belonging
to minority groups” in the list of principles.
The Lisbon Treaty has maintained Article 2 of the
Constitutional Treaty:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human
dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law
and respect for human rights, including the rights of
persons belonging to minorities. These values are
common to the Member States in a society in which
pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice,
solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.www.eipa.eu
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However, the article of the Constitutional Treaty stating
that the Union shall be open to all European states which
respect the collective values and are committed to promote
them (Article I-58), clearly stressing the “open” nature of
the European project, has been dropped. The European
Council’s Draft Mandate for the 2007 IGC decided to
return to the old wording and to make clear that, even
though only states that respect and promote these values
may apply, the acceptance of the application still lies with
the EU, which still can reject any future application on these
grounds.
The role of the European and national parliaments The role of the European and national parliaments The role of the European and national parliaments The role of the European and national parliaments The role of the European and national parliaments
A second change introduced by the Lisbon Treaty is the
obligation to inform the European Parliament and the
national parliaments about any new membership
application. So far, the role of the EP has been limited to
giving the “assent” required for enlargement decisions.
The role of the national parliaments has been limited to
ratification of the accession treaties once they had been
signed, according to the procedures established by the
national law. The new change in the enlargement procedure
echoes broader trends to increase the role of the EP in the
EU decision-making process, and to improve the information
and interaction with national legislative assemblies as a
means to reduce the democratic deficit of the Union.
Two Declarations on national parliaments in the Treaty
of Maastricht, further developed and included as Protocols
in the Treaty of Amsterdam, already regulated better
communication procedures with national parliaments and
fostered inter-parliamentary cooperation.9 Declaration No.
23 of the Final Act of Nice listed the role of national
parliaments in the European architecture as one of the four
key questions which the next IGC should address. Indeed
56 (out of 102) members of the Convention represented
national parliaments and there was a specific working
group to examine the role of the national parliaments
(O’Brennan and Raunio 2007). It was the Constitutional
Treaty that established that both the EP and national
parliaments should be notified of any membership
application (Art. I-58) and the Draft Mandate for the 2007
IGC maintained the clause in the revised article on
enlargement.
This new provision could have a twofold effect. The
decision to give a country the candidate status lies in the
European Council, usually in accordance with the
recommendation made by the Commission, which has
traditionally played the role of securing the support of the
most reluctant member governments for the accession of
some candidates. Widening the public debate and bringing
the decision-making closer to the national constituencies
may contribute to increase the legitimacy of the process
and improve the understanding by the citizens, but it could
also make this consensus-searching task much more difficult.
However, this new provision may not involve big changes
compared to the past. In practice, the EP and national
parliaments were already informed about membership
applications, either through formal mechanisms such as
hearings and reports from the executives, or informal
mechanisms like intra-parties relationships.
The explicit reference to conditions laid down by the The explicit reference to conditions laid down by the The explicit reference to conditions laid down by the The explicit reference to conditions laid down by the The explicit reference to conditions laid down by the
European Council European Council European Council European Council European Council
The Treaty of Lisbon has included the requirement to
consider conditions of eligibility defined by the European
Council when accepting or rejecting an application, which
was not explicitly foreseen in the Constitutional Treaty. This
has largely been intended as a reassuring response to
public concerns about enlargement. However, it may not in
fact represent any major change in practice.
It was the then European Assembly – subsequently the
European Parliament – the first to set any membership
Taking Europe into the 21st century
© European Communities, 1995-2008
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criteria. Only six years after its foundation, the 1962
Birkelbach Report stated the necessity to be a democratic
state in order to become a member of the European
Communities.10 This interpretation of Article 237 TEC was
soon implemented when
Franco’s Minister of Foreign
Affairs Castiella filed the
Spanish application for
membership on 9 February
1962. The request was
merely acknowledged but
the EC did not accept Spain
as a candidate because it
was not a democratic state.
A similar approach was
adopted in a declaration by
the Council at its meeting in
Copenhagen in 1978, again
in close relation with the
changes taking place in
Southern Europe. In its
Declaration on Democracy,
the Council stated that “the
respect and maintenance of representative democracy and
human rights in each member States are essential elements
of membership in the European Communities.”
The enumeration of specific criteria that candidates
should meet in order to become members was first developed
in the Commission’s report “Europe and the Challenge of
Enlargement”, submitted in June 1992 to the Lisbon
European Council. The Commission admitted that the
Community had never been “a closed club and could not
now refuse the historic challenge to assume its continental
responsibilities and contribute to the development of a
political and economic order for the whole of Europe”, but
also listed the conditions the candidate countries should
meet in order to become a member, namely share the
European values, be a democracy and respect the human
rights, adopt the objectives of the EC, including the CFSP
and all the acquis,  and assume all the membership
obligations. The latter was meant to avoid new opt-outs for
newcomers. The Lisbon Council agreed then to open
accession negotiations with the EFTA candidate countries –
after approval of the financial perspectives and ratification
of the Maastricht Treaty – and to further examine the
enlargement Eastwards.
In October 1992 John Major and Jacques Delors met
the Governments of Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic and
Slovakia and agreed to prepare a list of adhesion criteria
for the Edinburgh European Council in December. The
Commission submitted its first draft of “Towards a Closer
Association with the Countries of Central and Eastern
Europe” to the European Council in December 1992 and
again in June 1993, when the decision to give a clear
membership perspective to the CEECs was taken.11 Following
the Commission’s report, the Council specified the so-
called Copenhagen criteria, namely: the stability of
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities; the
existence of a functioning market economy as well as the
capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market
forces within the Union; and the ability to take on the
obligations of membership including adherence to the
aims of political, economic and monetary union. In order
to react to the specific challenges emerging from the
preparation of the CEECs for future accession, the European
Council added to the list the administrative capacity to
implement the acquis in its meeting in December 1995 in
Madrid, and the actual application of the acquis beyond its
mere adoption, in its meeting
in December 1997 in
Luxembourg.
However, fulfilment of the
criteria which have been laid
down since the early 1990s
has not so far been a con-
dition sine qua non to accept
a candidate. Decisions have
sometimes been taken for
political reasons rather than
as the result of a painstaking
assessment of the candi-
dates. Some candidate
countries did not fully fulfil
the criteria when the Com-
mission proposed, and the
European Council accept-
ed, to open negotiations with
5+1 candidate countries in December 1997; neither did
the other 5+1 when the Helsinki 1999 European Council
decided to open up the negotiation process to them.12
Bulgaria and Romania did not fulfil the criteria when the
accession treaties were signed, and did not do so even
when they became fully members of the Union, being
granted some extra time to meet their commitments.
Although this new provision in the Treaty of Lisbon,
together with the stricter conditionality envisaged in the new
strategy for enlargement, is meant to avoid similar
circumstances in the future, the final word will still lie with
the European Council, and nothing prevents future decisions
on enlargement from being taken according to the political
preferences of the day.
Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks Concluding remarks
Against the background of a new strategy on enlargement
based on consolidation of existing commitments, better
communication to citizens, stricter conditionality and the
consideration of the EU’s capacity to integrate new members,
the current treaty reform has introduced some changes to
Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union, which specifies
the basic procedures for accession of new members. These
relate to the promotion of the EU values, better information
to both the national and the European parliaments and the
explicit reference to conditions for entry laid down by the
European Council. While the first two were already envisaged
in the Constitutional Treaty, the last was added during the
2007 intergovernmental negotiations, which also dropped
the article of the Constitutional Treaty which stated that the
Union shall be open to all European states which respect
the collective values and are committed to promote them.
Only states that respect and promote these values may
apply but the treaty makes it clear that the decision to accept
any application lies in the EU.
The new provisions, as compared with the constitutional
text, reflect to some extent the less favourable climate on
enlargement. However, they may not represent any major
change in practice. The provisions on the European and
national parliaments and on the conditions set by the
European Council can be regarded as a mere codification
The new provisions, as
compared with the
constitutional text, reflect to
some extent the less
favourable climate on
enlargement. However,
they may not represent any
major change in practice.www.eipa.eu
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of existing practice. Even if the addition of some values and
the requirement not only to respect but also promote them
in order to be eligible to apply may provide substantive
grounds to discourage some applications, and even though
the application of stricter conditionality may make future
accession processes more difficult, EU enlargement will
probably remain dependent on the politics of the day and
the will of the European Council, as has always been the
case.
Beyond this, we can venture that, even for those countries
that have already acquired candidate status or the “European
perspective”, the accession process is very likely to be long
and strict. The main challenge for the EU, on the other
hand, will now be to develop new ways to manage its
relations with these countries, as well as with those that
have not yet even been granted the European perspective,
on the basis of the new article in the Treaty on European
Union which provides for a special relationship with
“neighbouring countries” – but without being able to offer
so convincingly the perspective of accession which has so
far been such an effective tool for the EU to wield “soft
power” around its edges.
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